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Abstract—The enormous increase in the usage of communica-
tion networks has made protection against node and link failures
essential in the deployment of reliable networks. To prevent loss
of data due to node failures, a network protection strategy is
proposed that aims to withstand such failures. Particularly, a
protection strategy against any single node failure is designed for
a given network with a set of n disjoint paths between senders
and receivers. Network coding and reduced capacity are deployed
in this strategy without adding extra working paths to the readily
available connection paths. This strategy is based on protection
against node failures as protection against multiple link failures.
In addition, the encoding and decoding operational aspects of
the premeditated protection strategy are demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increase in the capacity of backbone networks,
the failure of a single link or node can result in the loss of
enormous amounts of information, which may lead to catas-
trophes, or at least loss of revenue. Network connections are
therefore provisioned such that they can survive such failures.
Several techniques to provide network survivability have been
introduced in the literature. Such techniques either add extra
resources, or reserve some of the available network resources
as backup circuits, just for the sake of recovery from failures.
Recovery from failures is also required to be agile in order
to minimize the network outage time. This recovery usually
involves two steps: fault diagnosis and location, and rerouting
connections. Hence, the optimal network survivability problem
is a multi-objective problem in terms of resource efficiency,
operation cost, and agility [13].
Network coding allows the intermediate nodes not only
to forward packets using network scheduling algorithms, but
also encode/decode them using algebraic primitive operations,
see [1], [5], [6], [12] and the references therein. As an
application of network coding, data loss because of failures
in communication links can be detected and recovered if
the sources are allowed to perform network coding opera-
tions [11].
In network survivability, the four different types of failures
that might affect network operations are [10], [14]: 1) link
failure, 2) node failure, 3) shared risk link group (SRLG)
failure, and 4) network control system failure. Henceforth,
one needs to design network protection strategies against these
types of failures. Although the common frequent failures are
link failures, node failures sometimes happen due to burned
swritch/router, fire, or any other hardware damage. In addition,
the failure might be due to network maintenance. However,
node failure is more damaging than link or system failures
since multiple connections may be affected by the failure of
a single node.
Recently, the authors have proposed employing the network
coding technique in order to protect against single and multiple
link failures [4], [2], [8], in a manner that achieves both
agility and resource efficiency. The idea is to form linear
combinations of data packets transmitted on the working
circuits, and transmit these combinations simultaneously on
a shared protection circuit. The protection circuit can take the
form of an additional p-cycle [7], [8], a path or a general tree
network [9]. In the case of failures, the linear combinations
can be used by the end nodes of the connection(s) affected by
the failure(s) to recover the lost data packets. These network
protection strategies against link failures using network coding
have been extended to use reduced capacities instead of
reserving, or even adding separate protection circuits [4], [2].
The advantages of using network coding-based protection are
twofold: first, one set of protection circuits is shared between
a number of connections, hence leading to reduced protection
cost; and second, copies of data packets are transmitted on the
shared protection circuit after being linearly combined, hence
leading to fast recovery of lost data since failure detection and
data rerouting are not needed.
In this paper, we consider the problem of providing pro-
tection against node failures by the means of network coding
and the reduced capacity techniques. As a byproduct of this
protection strategy, protection against any single link failure
is also guaranteed. This is based on representing the node
failure by the failure of multiple links. However, the failed
links are not any arbitrary links. Since working paths used by
the connections that are protected together are link disjoint,
the links that need to be protected are used by different
connections.
II. NETWORK MODEL
The following points highlight the network model and main
considerations.
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Fig. 1. A Network N with a set of nodes V and a set of edges E. The
nodes V consist of sources S, receivers R, and relay nodes V . The node n5
represents a failed node with 3 working connections that must be protected
at the failure incidence.
• Let N be a network represented by an abstract graph
G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E be set
of undirected edges. Let S and R be sets of independent
sources and destinations, respectively. The set V = V ∪
S∪R contains the relay nodes, sources, and destinations,
respectively, as show in Fig. 1. Assume for simplicity that
|S| = |R| = n, hence the set of sources is equal to the
set of receivers.
• A path (connection) is a set of edges connected together
with a starting node (sender) and an ending node (re-
ceiver).
Li = {(si, w1i), (w1i, w2i), . . . , (w(m)i, ri)}, (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (w(j−1)i, wji) ∈ E, and +ve integer
m.
• The node can be a router, switch, or an end terminal
depending on the network model N and the transmission
layer, see Fig. 2.
• L is a set of paths L = {L1, L2, . . . , Ln} carrying the
data from the sources to receivers. Connection paths are
link disjoint and provisioned in the network between
senders and receivers. All connections have the same
bandwidth, otherwise a connection with a high bandwidth
can be divided into multiple connections, each of which
has the unit capacity. There are exactly n connections. A
sender with a high capacity can divide its capacity into
multiple unit capacities.
• We consider the case that the failures happen in the
relay nodes. The failures in the relay nodes might happen
due to a failed switch, router, or any connecting point
as shown in fig. 1. We assume that the failures are
independent of each other.
Definition 1 (Node Relay Degree): Let u be an arbitrary
node in V = V\{S ∪ R}, which relays the traffic between
source and terminal nodes. The number of connections passing
through this node is called the node relay degree, and is
referred to as d(u). Put differently:
d(u) =
∣∣{Li : (u,w) ∈ Li, ∀w ∈ V, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∣∣. (2)
Note that the above definition is different from the graph
theoretic definition of the node degrees; input and output
degrees. However, the node degree must not be less than the
node relay degree. Furthermore, the node relay degree of a
node u is d(u) ≤ ⌊µ(u)/2⌋, where µ(u) is the degree of a
node u in an undirected graph.
We can define the network capacity from the min-cut max-
flow information theoretic view [1]. It can be described as
follows.
Definition 2: The unit capacity of a connecting path Li
between si and ri is defined by
ci =
{
1, Li is active;
0, otherwise. (3)
The total capacity of N is given by the summation of all path
capacities. What we mean by an active path is that the receiver
is able to receive and process packets throughout this path, see
for further details [3].
Clearly, if all paths are active then the total capacity of
all connections is n and the normalized capacity is 1. If
we assume there are n disjoint paths, then, in general, the
normalized capacity of the network for the active and failed
paths is computed by
CN =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci. (4)
The working paths on a network with n connection paths
carry traffic under normal operations, see Fig. 2. The Protec-
tion paths provide an alternate backup path to carry the traffic
in case of failures. A protection scheme ensures that data sent
from the sources will reach the receivers in case of failure
incidences on the working paths [2], [4].
III. PROTECTION AGAINST A SINGLE NODE FAILURE
In this section we demonstrate a model for network pro-
tection against a single node failure (SNF) using network
coding. Previous work focused on network protection against
single and multiple link failures using rerouting and sending
packets throughout different links. We use network coding and
reduced capacity on the paths carrying data from the sources
to destinations. The idea has been developed for the purpose
of link and path failures in [2], [7]. We present a protection
strategy denoted by NPS-t. Under NPS-t, the normalized
network capacity is based on the max-flow between sources
and destinations, and its given by (n − t)/n, where t is the
maximum number of connections traversing any node in the
network, i.e. in other words, it is the max node degree. We
develop the design methodology of this strategy. In addition
we derive bounds on the field size and encoding operations.
Assume we have the same definitions as shown in the
previous section. Let d(u) be the relay node degree of a node
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Fig. 2. Network protection against a single path failure using reduced
capacity and network coding. One path out of n primary paths carries encoded
data. The black points represent various other relay nodes
u in V . We define d0 to be the max over all node’s relay
degrees in the network N .
d0 = max
u∈V
d(u) (5)
Note that do is the degree representing the max links that can
fail, in other words it is the number of working paths that
might fail due to the failure of a relay node. Let v be the node
with relay degree d0, and assume v to be the failed node. Our
goal is to protect the network N against this node failure.
In fact d0 represents a set of failed connections caused by a
failure of the node v in the network N . Although the failure of
v is represented by the failure of 2d0 links, each incoming link
at v has a corresponding outgoing link, and if either, or both of
these two links fail, the effect on the connection is the same.
Therefore, our protection strategy is based on representing the
node failure by the failure of d0 connections, and we therefore
need to protect against d0 failed connections.
A. NPS-t Protecting SNF with d0 = t and Achieving (n−t)/n
Normalized Capacity
Assume the sender si sends a message to the receiver ri
via the path Li. Also, assume without loss of generality that t
disjoint working paths have failed due to the failure of a single
node. Then, we describe protection code as shown in Scheme
(6). Under this protection scheme, n− t of the working paths
will carry plain data units denoted by xij ’s, i.e. the data unit
transmitted on working path j in round i. The remaining t
paths will carry linear combinations, which are denoted by
yi’s. They will be used to recover from data unit losses due
to the failure.
In general, yℓ is given by
yℓ =
(j−1)t∑
i=1
aℓix
j
i +
n∑
i=jt+1
aℓix
j
i
for (j − 1)t+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ jt, 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊n
t
⌋. (7)
We consider that the coefficients ali’s are taken from a finite
field with q > 2 alphabets. Later in this section, we will show
how to perform the encoding and decoding operations for the
purpose of recovery from failures. In addition, we will derive
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bounds on the field size in the next Section. The following
Theorem gives the normalized capacity of NPS-t strategy.
Theorem 3: Let n be the total number of disjoint connec-
tions from sources to receivers. The capacity of NPS-t strategy
against t path failures as a result of a single node failure is
given by
CN = (n− t)/(n) (8)
Proof: In NPS-t, there are t paths that will carry encoded
data in each round time in a particular session. Without loss
of generality, consider the case in which n/t is an integer1
or assume that ⌊n/t⌋. Therefore, there exists (n/t) rounds, in
which the capacity is (n− t) in each round. Also, the capacity
in the first round is n− t. Hence, we have
CN =
∑n/t
i=1(n− t)
(n/t)n
=
n− t
n
(9)
The advantages of NPS-t strategy described in Scheme (6)
are that:
• The data is encoded and decoded online, and it will be
sent and received in different rounds. Once the receivers
detect failures, they are able to obtain a copy of the lost
data without delay by querying the neighboring nodes
with unbroken working paths.
• The approach is suitable for applications that do not
tolerate packet delay such as real-time applications, e.g.,
multimedia and TV transmissions.
• %100 recovery against any single node failure is guar-
anteed. In addition, up to t disjoint path failures can be
recovered from.
• Using this strategy, no extra paths are needed. This will
make this approach more suitable for applications, in
1The general case in which n/t is not an integer can be accommodated by
running the strategy for m⌊(n/t)⌋ rounds, where m is the smallest integer
such that mn mod t = 0.
4which adding extra paths, or reserving links or paths just
for protection, may not be feasible.
• The encoding and decoding operations are linear, and the
coefficients of the variables xji ’s are taken from a finite
field with q > 2 elements.
B. Encoding Operations
Assume that each connection path Li (L) has a unit capacity
from a source si (S) to a receiver ri (R). The data sent from
the sources S to the receivers R is transmitted in rounds. Under
NPS-t, in every round n− t paths are used to carry plain data
(xji ), and t paths are used to carry protected data units. there
are t protection paths. Therefore, to treat all connections fairly,
there will be ⌊n/t⌋ rounds, and in each round the capacity is
given by n-t.
We consider the case in which all symbols xji ’s belong to
the same round. The first t sources transmit the first encoded
data units y1, y2, . . . , yt, and in the second round, the next t
sources transmit yt+1, yt+2, . . . , y2t, and so on. All sources
S and receiver R must keep track of the round numbers. Let
IDsi and xsi be the ID and data initiated by the source si.
Assume the round time j in session δ is given by tjδ. Then the
source si will send packetsi on the working path Li which
includes
Packetsi = (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ) (10)
Also, the source sj , that transmits on the protection path,
will send a packet packetsj :
Packetsj = (IDsj , yk, t
ℓ
δ), (11)
where yk is defined in (7). Hence the protection paths are used
to protect the data transmitted in round ℓ, which are included in
the xli data units. The encoded data yk is computed in a simple
way where source sj , for example, will collect all sources’
data units, and using proper coefficients, will compute the yk
data units defined in Scheme (7). In this case every data unit
xℓi is multiplied by a unique coefficient ai ∈ Fq . This will
differentiate the encoded data y′is. So, we have a system of t
independent equations at each round time that will be used to
recover at most t unknown variables.
C. Proper Coefficients Selection
One way to select the coefficients aℓj’s in each round such
that we have a system of t linearly independent equations is
by using the matrix H shown in (12). Let q be the order of
a finite field, and α be the root of unity in Fq . Then we can
use this matrix to define the coefficients of the senders as:
H =


1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αt−1 α2(t−1) · · · α(t−1)(n−1)

 . (12)
We have the following assumptions about the encoding
operations as shown in Scheme (15).
1) Clearly if we have one failure t = 1, then all coefficients
will be one. The first sender will always choose the unit
value in the first row.
2) If we assume d0 = t, then the y1, y2, . . . , yt equations in
the first round are written as:
y1 =
n∑
i=t+1
x1i , y2 =
n∑
i=t+1
α(i−1)x1i , (13)
yj =
n∑
i=t+1
αi(j−1) mod (q−1)x1i , 1 ≤ j ≤ t (14)
Therefore, the scheme that describes the encoding operations
in the first round for t link failures can be described as
round one, t failures
y1 y2 y3 . . . yt
s1 → r1 1 1 1 . . . 1
s2 → r2 1 α α2 . . . αt−1
s3 → r3 1 α2 α4 . . . α2(t−1)
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.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
sn → rn 1 αn−1 α2(n−1) . . . α(t−1)(n−1)
(15)
This Scheme gives the general theme to choose the coefficients
at any particular round in any session. However, the encoded
data yi’s are defined as shown in Equation (14). In other words,
for the first round in session one, the coefficients of the plain
data x1, x2, . . . , xt are set to zero. The scheme can be extended
directly to any encoded data yk.
D. Decoding Operations
We know that the coefficients aℓ1, aℓ2, . . . , aℓn are elements of
a finite field, Fq , hence the inverses of these elements exist and
they are unique. Once a node fails which causes t data units to
be lost, and once the receivers receive t linearly independent
equations, they can linearly solve these equations to obtain
the t unknown data units. At one particular session j, we have
three cases for the failures:
i) All t link failures happened in the working paths, i.e. the
working paths have failed to convey the messages xℓi in
round ℓ. In this case, n− t equations will be received, t
of which are linear combinations of n− t data units, and
the remaining n− 2t are explicit xi data units, for a total
of n− t equations in n− t data units. In this case any t
equations (packets) of the t encoded packets can be used
to recover the lost data.
ii) All t link failures happened in the protection paths at the
failed node. In this case, the exact remaining n−t packets
are working paths and they do not experience any failures.
Therefore, no recovery operations are needed.
iii) The third case is that the failure might happen in some
working and protection paths simultaneously in one par-
ticular round in a session. The recover can be done using
any t protection paths as shown in case i.
5IV. BOUNDS ON THE FINITE FIELD SIZE, Fq
In this section we derive lower and upper bounds on the
alphabet size required for the encoding and decoding opera-
tions. In the proposed schemes we assume that unidirectional
connections exist between the senders and receivers, which the
information can be exchanged with little cost. The first result
shows that the alphabet size required must be greater than the
number of connections that carry unencoded data.
Theorem 4: Let n be the number of disjoint connections in
the network model N . Then the receivers are able to decode
the encoded messages over Fq and will recover from t ≥ 2
path failures passing through if
q ≥ n− t+ 1. (16)
Also, if q = pr, then r ≤ ⌈logp(n + 1)⌉. The binary field is
sufficient in case of a single path failure.
Proof: We will prove the lower bound by construction.
Assume a NPS-t at one particular time tℓδ in the round ℓ in a
certain session δ. The protection code of NPS-t against t path
failures is given as
Ct =


1 1 1 · · · 1
1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αt−1 α2(t−1) · · · α(t−1)(n−1)


(17)
Without loss of generality, the interpretation of Equa-
tion (17) is as follows:
i) The columns correspond to the senders S and rows
correspond to t encoded data y1, y2, . . . , yt.
ii) The first row corresponds to y1 if we assume the first
round in session one. Furthermore, every row represents
the coefficients of every senders at a particular round.
iii) The column i represents the coefficients of the sender si
through all protection paths L1, L2, . . . , Lt.
iv) Any element αi ∈ Fq appears once in a column and row,
except in the first column and first row, where all elements
are one’s. All columns (rows) are linearly independent.
Due to the fact that the t failures might occur at any t
working paths of L = {l1, L2, . . . , ln}, then we can not
predict the t protection paths as well. This means that t
out of the n columns do not participate in the encoding
coefficients, because t paths will carry encoded data. We notice
that removing any t out of the n columns in Equation (17)
will result in n − t different coefficients in each column.
Furthermore any t columns will give a µ×µ square sub-matrix
that has a full-rank, this will be proved in our extended work.
Therefore the smallest finite field that satisfies this condition
must have n− t+ 1 elements.
The upper bound comes from the case of no failures, hence
q ≥ (n+ 1). Assume q is a prime, then the result follows.
if q = 2r, then in general the previous bound can be stated
as
n− t+ 1 ≤ q ≤ 2⌈log2(n+1)⌉. (18)
We defined the feasible solution for the encoding and
decoding operations of NPS-t as the solution that has integer
reachable upper bounds.
Corollary 5: The protection code (17) always gives a fea-
sible solution.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Protection against node and link failures are extensional in
all communication networks. In this paper, we presented a
model for network protection against a single node failure,
which is equivalent to protection against t link failures, and
can therefore be used to protect against t link failures. We
demonstrated an implementation strategy for the proposed
network protection scheme. The network capacity is estimated,
and bounds on the network resources are established. Our fu-
ture work will include approaches for deploying the proposed
protection strategy.
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